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WELLPOSEDNESS OF MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH COMMON
NOISE UNDER A WEAK MONOTONICITY CONDITION
SARAN AHUJA∗
Abstract. In this paper, we consider Mean Field Games in the presence of common noise
relaxing the usual independence assumption of individual random noise. We assume a simple linear
model with terminal cost satisfying a convexity and a weak monotonicity property. Our main result
is showing existence and uniqueness of a Mean Field Game solution using the Stochastic Maximum
Principle. The uniqueness is a result of a monotonicity property similar to that of Lasry and Lions.
We use the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to establish an existence over a small time duration and
show that it can be extended over an arbitrary finite time duration.
Key words. mean field games, common noise, forward-backward stochastic differential equa-
tions, stochastic maximum principle.
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1. Introduction. A Mean Field Game, or MFG for short, is a model recently
proposed by Lasry and Lions in his series of papers [24, 25, 26] and independently by
Caines, Huang, and Malhame´ [20], who named it differently as Nash Certainty Equiv-
alence. It describes a limiting model of a stochastic differential game with a large
number of players, symmetric cost, and weak interaction. Specifically, each player
executes a stochastic control problem whose cost and/or dynamics depend not only
on their own state and control but also on other players’ states. However, this inter-
action is weak in a sense that a player feels the effect of other players only through
the empirical distribution. Searching for a Nash equilibrium strategy for N -player
games is known to be intractable when N is large as the dimensionality grows with
the number of players. However, by assuming independence of the random noise in
the players’ state processes, symmetry of the cost functions, and a mean-field inter-
action, we can formally take the limit as N → ∞ and reduce a problem to solving a
fully-coupled system of forward-backward Partial Differential Equations (PDEs). The
backward one is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the value function for
each player while the forward one is the Fokker-Planck (FP) equation for the evolution
of the player’s distribution. This limiting system is more tractable and one can use
its solution to approximate Nash equilibrium strategies of the N -player games. Lasry
and Lions studied this limiting model extensively as well as rigorously analyzed the
limit in some cases [24, 25, 26].
Since the introduction of MFG in 2006, the literature in this area has grown
tremendously. See [2, 12] or for a recent survey and [5] for a summary of a series
of Lions’ lectures given at the Colle´ge de France. Gue´ant wrote an introduction
to the area highlighting various applications [19]. See [16, 17, 18] for several other
contributions by Gue´ant on the subject. Gomes, Mohr, and Souza studied the finite
state problem, both in discrete time [13] and continuous time [14]. Carmona and
Delarue [7] approached the MFG problem from a probabilistic point of view. By
using a Stochastic Maximum Principle instead of a Dynamic Programming Principle
to formulate the control problem, one gets Forward Backward Stochastic Differential
Equations (FBSDEs for short) of McKean-Vlasov type instead of coupled HJB-FP
equations.
∗Department of Mathematics, Stanford University, Sloan Hall, Stanford, California 94305
(ssunny@stanford.edu).
1
2 SARAN AHUJA
One important assumption in most of the prior work is independence of the
random factors in each player’s state processes. From this assumption, the distribution
of each player evolves deterministically in the limit. It is this property that plays a
key role in reducing the dimension of this complex problem and making it tractable.
However, many models in applications do not satisfy this assumption. For instance,
in financial applications, any reasonable model which attempts to understand the
interactions of a large number of market participants will have to assume that they
are exposed to some type of overall market randomness. This common random factor
is applied to all the players, and, as a result, the independence assumption does not
hold. See [11] for an explicit example of a linear-quadratic MFG model with common
noise used to model inter-bank lending and borrowing.
The presence of common noise clearly adds an extra layer of complexity to the
problem as the empirical distribution of players at the limit now evolves stochastically.
Following the PDE approach of Lasry and Lions, common noise then turns HJB-FP
equations to stochastic HJB-FP equations which are of Forward Backward Stochastic
Partial Differential Equation (FBSPDE for short) type. This FBSPDE is clearly
more complicated than the FBPDE counterpart in the original MFG. Alternatively,
one could abandon the forward backward coupling and reformulate the problem as
a single PDE called the master equation. While the master equation contains all
the information about the MFG model, it requires new theories and tools as it is a
second order infinite-dimensional HJB involving derivatives with respect to probability
measures. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existence theory for it and most
of the discussion so far has been largely formal. See [3, 8, 15] for instance. On the
other hand, as we shall see, the probabilistic approach of Carmona and Delarue can
be extended more naturally to accommodate the common noise. The law of the state
process which occurs in the McKean-Vlasov FBSDE from the Stochastic Maximum
Principle will simply be replaced by its conditional law given the common Brownian
motion path.
The goal of this paper is to establish existence and uniqueness for MFG models
in the presence of common noise. Similar to Carmona and Delarue [7] for the case
of no common noise, we use a probabilistic approach to MFG based on the Stochas-
tic Maximum Principle and operate under a linear-convex framework. Nonetheless,
the existence proof in [7], which relies on Schauder fixed point theorem applied to a
compact subset of deterministic flow of probability measures, does not carry over to
the case of common noise. In this case, we are working with a much larger space of
stochastic flow of probability measures of which we cannot find an invariant compact
subset. Instead, we apply Banach fixed point theorem to show existence over small
time duration and attempt to extend the solution over arbitrary time. To accomplish
this, we introduce the weak monotonicity assumption (see (A4)) on the cost func-
tion. This condition can be viewed as a stronger version of the weak mean reverting
condition used in [7] to show existence for the model without common noise. For
the uniqueness, our condition, as the name suggests, is weaker than the monotonicity
condition of Lasry and Lions used in [5, 7, 15]. As a by product, we extend the unique-
ness result for MFG without common noise. More importantly, this condition covers
many interesting and practical cases which do not verify Lasry and Lions’ monotonic-
ity condition; a notable example includes linear-quadratic models. Intuitively, this
condition gives a monotone property to the corresponding McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
from the Stochastic Maximum Principle. Similar to the result of Peng and Wu [28]
for a classical FBSDE, wellposed-ness of this McKean-Vlasov FBSDE can be shown
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under such monotone property. For notational simplicity, we select a simple state
process and running cost function, but from the result of [28], our result is expected
to hold under a more general setting (see Section 6). We would like to note that we do
not deal with the N -player games in this paper. Here, we focus on the wellposed-ness
of the MFG models with common noise.
In parallel to our work, there has been two recent papers [10, 23] which con-
tribute to the general existence theory of MFG models with common noise. In [10],
Carmona et al. deal with a notion of weak solutions as opposed to the strong solu-
tions constructed in this paper. They show, under great generality, the existence of
a weak solution to MFG models with common noise. However, notice that while the
assumptions in [10] are quite weak, they do not include many linear-quadratic models
which verify our assumptions. In [23], Lacker and Webster show the existence of a
strong solution, but only to a particular class of MFG models with common noise
that satisfy a translation invariant property. This class of models can be related to a
certain MFG model without common noise via a simple transformation. Comparing
[23] to our work, they imposes a different type of restriction on the objectives and use
different techniques to construct a strong solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a model for an
N -player stochastic differential game and formulate its limit, an MFG with common
noise. We then review the Stochastic Maximum Principle along with some existence
and uniqueness results of FBSDE in Section 3. In Section 4, we state and prove our
main result, existence and uniqueness of a solution to MFG models with common
noise. In Section 5, we provide the proofs for all the main lemmas used in Section 4.
2. Model. In this section, we describe a stochastic differential game model with
N players, then formulate the limit problem as an MFG with common noise. As
mentioned above, we do not deal with the N -player games in this paper. The material
in Section 2.1 only serves as a motivation for the formulation of the MFG problem in
Section 2.2 and will not play a role in other parts of the paper.
2.1. N-player Stochastic Differential Games. Let T be a fixed terminal
time, W i = (W it )0≤t≤T , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, W˜ = (W˜t)0≤t≤T are one dimensional inde-
pendent Brownian motions. Consider a stochastic dynamic game with N players.
Each player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} controls a state process X it in R given by
dX it = α
i
tdt+ σdW
i
t + σ˜dW˜t, X
i
0 = ξ
i
0
by selecting a control αi = (αit)0≤t≤T in H
2([0, T ];R), the set of progressively mea-
surable process β = (βt)0≤t≤T such that
E
[∫ T
0
β2t dt
]
<∞
where ξi0 is an initial state of player i. We assume that (ξ
i
0)1≤i≤N are independent
identically distributed, independent of all Brownian motions, and satisfy E[(ξi0)
2] <∞
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . We will refer to W i as an individual noise or idiosyncratic noise
and W˜ as a common noise.
Let P(R) denote the space of Borel probability measure on R, P2(R) denote the
subspace of P(R) with finite second moment, i.e. a probability measure m such that∫
x2dm(x) <∞.
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The space P2(R) is a complete separable metric space equipped with a Wasserstein
metric defined as
(2.1) W2(m1,m2) =
(
inf
γ∈Γ(m1,m2)
∫
R2
|x− y|2γ(dx, dy)
) 1
2
where Γ(m1,m2) denotes the collection of all probability measures onR
2 with marginals
m1 and m2.
Given the other players’ strategy, player i selects a control αi ∈ H 2([0, T ];R) to
minimize his/her expected total cost given by
J i(αi|(αj)j 6=i) := E
[∫ T
0
(αit)
2
2
dt+ g(X iT ,mT )
]
where (αj)j 6=i denotes a strategy profile of other players excluding i, g : R×P(R)→ R
is the terminal cost which we assume to be identical for all players, and mt is the
empirical distribution of (X it)1≤i≤N , i.e.
mt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXit (dx)
Note that the strategies of the other players have an effect on the cost of player
i through mt and that is the main feature that makes this set up a game. We are
seeking a type of equilibrium solution widely used in game theory settings called Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. A set of strategies (αi)1≤i≤N is a Nash Equilibrium if for every
player i, αi is optimal given the other players’ strategies are (αj)j 6=i. In other words,
J i(αi|(αj)j 6=i) = min
α∈H 2([0,T ];R)
J i(α|(αj)j 6=i), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
Solving for a Nash equilibrium of an N -player game is impractical when N is large
due to high dimensionality. So we formally take the limit as N →∞ and consider the
limit problem, called a Mean Field Game (MFG), instead. Solving an MFG problem
yields a control that can be used to approximate the exact Nash equilibrium for an
N -player game. See [2, 7, 22] for a discussion and results on an approximate Nash
equilibrium for N -player games. In this work, we will only show the well-posedness of
an MFG problem in the presence of common noise. The approximation to N -player
games will be treated in our future work.
2.2. MFG with Common Noise. We now formulate a MFG problem in the
presence of a common noise by formally taking a limit as N →∞. By considering the
limiting problem and assuming that each player adopts the same strategy, one can
represent the player distribution mt by a conditional law of a single representative
player given a common noise. In other words, we formulate the MFG with common
noise as a stochastic control problem for a single (representative) agent with an equi-
librium condition involving a conditional law of the state process given a common
noise.
Let T > 0 be a fixed terminal time, W = (Wt)0≤t≤T , W˜ = (W˜t)0≤t≤T be one
dimensional independent Brownian motions defined on a complete filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) satisfying the usual conditions. We assume that Ft is
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a natural filtration generated by ξ0, (Ws)0≤s≤t, and (W˜s)0≤s≤t, F˜t is generated by
(W˜s)0≤s≤T , both augmented by P-null sets.
For a filtration Gt ⊆ Ft, we let L
2
Gt
denote the set of Gt-measurable square
integrable random variable and let H 2
G
([0, T ];R) denote the set of all Gt-progressively-
measurable process β = (βt)0≤t≤T such that
E
[∫ T
0
β2t dt
]
<∞
We define similarly the space H 2
G
([s, t];R) for any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T and we will often
omit the subscript and write H 2([0, T ];R) for H 2
F
([0, T ];R).
Let ξ0 ∈ L
2
F0
be an initial state. For any control α ∈ H 2([0, T ];R), we denote
by Xα = (Xαt )0≤t≤T the corresponding state process, i.e.
Xαt = ξ0 +
∫ t
0
αtdt+ σWt + σ˜W˜t,
and mαt = L(X
α
t |F˜t) for all t ∈ [0, T ] where L(·|F˜t) denotes the conditional law given
F˜t. It is easy to see that when α ∈ H
2([0, T ];R) and E[ξ20 ] <∞, m
α
t has finite second
moment a.s., i.e. mαt ∈ P2(R) a.s.
Remark 2.2. An existence of a progressively-measurable version of (L(Xαt |F˜t))0≤t≤T
is guaranteed by Lemma 1.1 in [21] for instance. In fact, in this case there exist a
continuous version by the Kolmogorov continuity theorem.
Problem Definition. A MFG with common noise is defined as follows: Find a
control αˆ ∈ H 2([0, T ];R) such that, given (mαˆt )0≤t≤T , αˆ is an optimal control for a
stochastic control problem with state process
dXt = αtdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t, X0 = ξ0
and cost
J(α|mαˆ) := E
[∫ T
0
α2t
2
dt+ g(XT ,m
αˆ
T )
]
In other words, it satisfies
J(αˆ|mαˆ) ≤ J(α|mαˆ), ∀α ∈ H 2([0, T ];R)
We will often refer to the MFG problem described above as σ˜-MFG to emphasize
the existence of a common noise and call αˆ a solution to σ˜-MFG with initial ξ0. Note
that 0-MFG is simply the original MFG with independent Brownian motions.
We would like to emphasize that in the control problem above, mαˆt is exogenous
and is not affected by a player’s control. Thus, MFG is a standard control problem
with an additional equilibrium condition. A type of problem where a player’s control
can affect the law is referred to as Mean Field Type Control Problem. See [2, 6, 9] for
a treatment on this different model and some discussion of the distinctions between
the two problems.
Alternatively, we can view the σ˜-MFG problem as a fixed point problem as follows:
Given a strategy α ∈ H 2([0, T ];R), then mαt is determined as defined above. With
mαt given as a random flow of probability measures, we can solve a control problem
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for a representative player. This step yields a new optimal control α˜. The following
diagram summarizes the process
(2.2) αˆ = (αˆt)0≤t≤T → m
αˆ = (mαˆt )0≤t≤T → α˜ = (α˜t)0≤t≤T
By the definition of the σ˜-MFG problem, αˆ is a σ˜-MFG solution if and only if it is a
fixed point of this map.
Our main result in this paper is to show existence and uniqueness of a solution to
σ˜-MFG, i.e. a fixed point of diagram (2.2). We will define this map formally through
FBSDE after discussing the Stochastic Maximum Principle in the next section.
3. Stochastic Maximum Principle. Stochastic Maximum Principle (SMP for
short) or Pontryagin Maximimum Principle is an approach to a control problem which
studies optimality conditions satisfied by an optimal control. It gives sufficient and
necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal control in terms of solvability of
a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE for short) of an adjoint process.
In this section, we apply SMP to the control problem in the MFG model. For more
details about SMP, we refer to [29] or [30].
To apply sufficient conditions for the SMP, the convexity assumption on the cost
functions is needed. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that g : R ×
P2(R)→ R satisfies
(A1). (Lipschitz in x) For each m ∈ P2(R), gx(x,m) exists and is Lipschitz
continuous in x i.e. there exist a constant Cg such that
|gx(x,m)− gx(x
′,m)| ≤ Cg|x− x
′|
for any x, x′ ∈ R
(A2). (convexity) For any x, x′ ∈ R,m ∈ P2(R),
(3.1) (gx(x,m)− gx(x
′,m))(x− x′) ≥ 0
We are ready to state the SMP for our control problem. Suppose we are given a
random probability measure mT (ω), then we have a standard control problem with
a random terminal cost function given by g(·,mT (ω)). The SMP for our model then
reads
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that there exist an adapted solution (Xˆt, Yˆt, Zˆt,
ˆ˜Zt)0≤t≤T
to the FBSDE
(3.2)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
X0 = ξ0, YT = gx(XT ,mT )
such that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
(Xˆ2t + Yˆ
2
t ) +
∫ T
0
Zˆ2t +
ˆ˜Z2t dt
]
<∞,
then αˆt = −Yˆt gives an optimal control to the control problem given mT . Furthermore,
for any β ∈ H 2([0, T ];R), the following estimate holds
(3.3) J(αˆ|m) +
1
2
|αˆ− β|2 ≤ J(β|m)
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Particularly, αˆt is the unique optimal control.
Proof. The proof is standard and we refer to Theorem 6.4.6 in [29]. The estimate
(3.3) requires strict convexity in α of the running cost function. The proof can be
found in Theorem 2.2. in [7].
Having stated the SMP, we now show that the FBSDE above is uniquely solvable,
thereby proving that the control problem for a fixed mT is uniquely solvable. We
state the result slightly more generally by allowing for a random terminal function
and an arbitrary initial and terminal time as it will be applied again in a subsequent
section. This result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.3 in [28] which gives
the existence and uniqueness of a solution to a monotone FBSDE.
Theorem 3.2. Let 0 ≤ s ≤ τ ≤ T and ξ ∈ L 2
Fτ
. Suppose v : R × Ω → R is a
Fτ -measurable Lipschitz continuous function satisfying a monotonicity condition
(v(x, ω)− v(x′, ω))(x− x′) ≥ 0
for all x, x′ ∈ R and ω ∈ Ω. Then there exist a unique adapted solution (Xt, Yt, Zt, Z˜t)s≤t≤τ
to
(3.4)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
Xs = ξ, Yτ = v(Xτ )
satisfying the following estimate
E
[
sup
s≤t≤τ
[|Xt|
2 + |Yt|
2] +
∫ τ
s
[|Zt|
2 + |Z˜t|
2]dt
]
≤ C(E[ξ2]+E[v2(0)]+(τ −s)(σ2+ σ˜2))
for some constant C depending on T and the Lipschitz constant of v.
As a result of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we have the following corollary
which shows that, for any given mT , the control problem for a representative player
is uniquely solvable, i.e. there exist a unique optimal control.
Corollary 3.3. Suppose (A1)-(A2) hold, then for any given mT , the con-
trol problem described above has a unique optimal control given by αˆt = −Yt, where
(Xt, Yt, Zt, Z˜t)0≤t≤T is the solution to the FBSDE (3.2).
Remark 3.4. In the context of Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP), which
involves an HJB equation for the value function, the adjoint equation of the Stochastic
Maximum Principle, under some regularity condition, is simply the backward SDE of
the gradient of the value function. For more details about the connection between SMP
and DPP, we refer to Theorem 6.4.7 in [29] for instance.
4. Existence and Uniqueness of σ˜-MFG solution. In this section, we state
and prove our main result which establishes an existence and uniqueness of a solution
to Mean Field Games with a common noise.
In [7], Carmona and Delarue showed existence of 0-MFG solution using SMP
approach. They established the result under a convexity assumption and what they
called a weak mean-reverting assumption on the cost function. The latter states that
for all x ∈ R and a constant C > 0.
(4.1) xgx(0, δx) ≥ −C(1 + |x|)
where δx denote the Dirac measure at x. They first proved the result under a bounded
derivative assumption on the function, then relaxed this assumption using an approx-
imation argument.
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In [5], using PDE method, Lasry and Lions showed the same result under similar
assumptions plus boundedness condition on the cost function. They gave existence of
a classical solution to a coupled HJB-FP equation. The uniqueness was shown in both
works [5, 7] under the following monotonicity condition (in m) on the cost function,
i.e ∫
(g(x,m1)− g(x,m2))d(m1 −m2)(x) ≥ 0
for any m1,m2 ∈ P2(R). This condition can be expressed in terms of random vari-
ables as follows: For any square-integrable random variables ξ and ξ′ defined on a
common probability space,
(4.2) E [g(ξ′,L(ξ′)) + g(ξ,L(ξ)) − g(ξ,L(ξ′))− g(ξ′,L(ξ))] ≥ 0
where L(·) denote the law of a random variable.
In the existence proof of both the Lasry and Lions PDE approach and the Car-
mona and Delarue probabilistic approach, they applied Schauder’s theorem to estab-
lish an existence of a fixed point. However, this strategy cannot be extended simply in
the presence of common noise as we no longer have a deterministic flow of probability
measures given by the law of the optimal state process. Instead, we have to deal with
a random flow of probability measures from a conditional law given a common noise.
Working with this larger space, we cannot establish compactness which is necessary
to apply the Schauder fixed point theorem in the same way.
In parallel to our work, Carmona et al. [10] overcome this issue by using discretiza-
tion of the common noise path. Working with this finite-dimensional approximation,
they were able to prove the existence of a solution to the discretized MFG and obtain
the existence of the original MFG by refining the approximation and passing the limit.
This construction gives the weak limit and leads to a notion of a weak MFG solution.
In this work, however, we adopt an alternative approach, namely the Banach
fixed point theorem. In the same way as in the proof of wellposedness of FBSDE,
the Banach fixed point theorem can be used to establish existence of a solution when
the time duration T is sufficiently small. This method can usually be applied in that
case because the solution estimate depends on T , and when T is sufficiently small, we
can get a contraction map easily. See [1, 27] for proofs of existence and uniqueness of
a solution to FBSDE for a small time duration. However, the small time restriction
is not a desirable assumption for obvious reasons, so we wish to extend the solution
to arbitrary time duration. To do so, we need an extra condition on g to be able to
control the Lipschitz constant of a new terminal condition as we move backwards in
time. So in addition to (A1), (A2), we will need the following assumptions on g
(A3). (Lipschitz in m) gx is Lipschitz continuous in m uniformly in x, i.e. there
exist a constant Cg such that
|gx(x,m)− gx(x,m
′)| ≤ CgW2(m,m
′)
for all x ∈ R,m,m′ ∈ P2(R), where W2(m,m
′) is the second order Wasserstein
metric defined by (2.1). This is equivalent to the following; for any x ∈ R, and any
square-integrable random variables ξ and ξ′ defined on a common probability space,
|gx(x,L(ξ)) − gx(x,L(ξ
′))| ≤ Cg(E|ξ − ξ
′|2)
1
2
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(A4). (weak monotonicity in m) For any m,m′ ∈ P2(R) and any γ ∈ P2(R
2)
with marginals m,m′ respectively,∫
R2
[(gx(x,m)− gx(y,m
′))(x − y)] γ(dx, dy) ≥ 0
Equivalently, for any square-integrable random variables ξ and ξ′ defined on a com-
mon probability space,
(4.3) E[gx(ξ,L(ξ)) − gx(ξ
′,L(ξ′))(ξ − ξ′)] ≥ 0
Remark 4.1. An interesting example of g which satisfies (A1)-(A4) is a general
quadratic cost where g is of the form
(4.4) g(x,m) = Ax2 + x
∫
ψ(y)dm(y) + F (m)
where ψ : R → R and F : P2(R) → R are Lipschitz continuous functions with
Lip(ψ) ≤ 2A. This form of g includes the following examples
g(x,m) =
(
x−
∫
ydm(y)
)2
(4.5)
g(x,m) =
∫
(x− y)2dm(y)
which occur frequently in applications (see [11, 19] for instance). More generally,
it includes the cost function in the Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games [4] where g
takes the form
g(x,m) = qx2 + q¯
(
x− s
∫
ym(y)
)2
where q, q¯, s are positive constants satisfying q + q¯ ≥ sq¯.
Our main result establishes, under (A1)-(A4), the existence and uniqueness of a
σ˜-MFG solution. In the existence proof, our assumptions are similar to those in [7]
except that we replace the weak mean-reverting condition (4.1) by the weak mono-
tonicity condition (4.3). When ξ = x, ξ′ = 0 is deterministic, (4.3) reads
(gx(x, δx)− gx(0, δ0))x ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R
where δx denote the Dirac measure at x. This implies (4.1), so one can view (4.3) as
a stronger version of (4.1). For the uniqueness result, when g is convex in x, the weak
monotonicity condition (4.3) is indeed a weaker version of the monotonicity condition
(4.2) which was used in [5, 7] for the uniqueness proof of a 0-MFG solution. The
lemma below shows this.
Lemma 4.2. Let h : R × P2(R) be a continuously differentiable function such
that h is convex and satisfies the monotonicity condition (4.2) stated above, then h
satisfies the weak monotonicity condition (4.3).
Proof. Suppose (4.2) holds. Let ξ, ξ′ ∈ L 2, then by convexity in x of h, we get
h(ξ′,L(ξ′))− h(ξ,L(ξ′)) ≤ hx(ξ
′,L(ξ′))(ξ′ − ξ)
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and
h(ξ,L(ξ)) − h(ξ′,L(ξ)) ≤ −hx(ξ,L(ξ))(ξ
′ − ξ)
Summing up, taking expectation, and using (4.2) yields (4.3).
The converse of the lemma above does not hold. Example (4.5) gives a cost
function that is convex in x, satisfies (4.3), but does not satisfy (4.2). Thus, one see
that our result gives a more general uniqueness result for 0-MFG when g is convex in
x.
4.1. Uniqueness. We begin by showing uniqueness of a σ˜-MFG solution
Theorem 4.3 (Uniqueness). Suppose (A1) − (A4) holds, then the σ˜-MFG with
initial condition ξ0 ∈ L
2
F0
has at most one solution.
Proof. Let αˆ1, αˆ2 ∈ H 2([0, T ];R) be solutions to σ˜-MFG with initial ξ0 ∈ L
2
F0
,
and let mit = L(X
αˆi
t |F˜t) for i = 1, 2. Recall that (F˜t)0≤t≤T is the filtration generated
by the common noise (W˜t)0≤t≤T . By Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3, we have that
for i ∈ {1, 2}, αˆi = −Y i where (X it , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)0≤t≤T is the solution to the FBSDE
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
X0 = ξ0, YT = gx(XT ,m
i
T )
From the fact that αˆi is the solution to σ˜-MFG, we get that mit is precisely the law
of X iT conditional on F˜t. That is, (X
i
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)0≤t≤T satisfies, for i = 1, 2,
dX it = −Y
i
t dt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dY it = Z
i
tdWt + Z˜
i
tdW˜t
X i0 = ξ0, Y
i
T = gx(X
i
T ,L(X
i
T |F˜T ))
Let ∆Xt = X
1
t −X
2
t and ∆Yt = Y
1
t − Y
2
t . Using Ito¯’s lemma, we get
E[∆XT∆YT ]−∆X0∆Y0 = −E
[∫ T
0
∆Y 2t dt
]
Since ∆X0 = 0 and from (4.3), it follows that
E[∆XT∆YT ] = E[(X
1
T −X
2
T )(gx(X
1
T ,L(X
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(X
2
T |F˜T ))]
= E
[
E
[
(X1T −X
2
T )(gx(X
1
T ,L(X
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(X
2
T |F˜T ))
∣∣∣F˜T ]] ≥ 0
Thus,
E
[∫ T
0
∆Y 2t dt
]
= −E[∆XT∆YT ] ≤ 0
so αˆ1 = αˆ2 in H 2([0, T ];R).
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4.2. Existence. Next, we state and prove the existence result for σ˜-MFG.
Theorem 4.4 (Existence). Under (A1)-(A4), there exist a solution to σ˜-MFG
with initial ξ0 ∈ L
2
F0
.
Before we delve into the proof, let us first define a following map whose fixed
point gives us a σ˜-MFG solution. This map is simply the rigorous definition of the
diagram (2.2) in Section 2 .
Let 0 ≤ s < τ ≤ T and v : R×L 2
Fτ
× Ω→ R satisties, for P-a.s.,
(v(x, ξ, ω)− v(x′, ξ, ω))(x− x′) ≥ 0(4.6)
|v(x, ξ, ω) − v(x′, ξ′, ω)|2 ≤ Cv
[
|x− x′|2 + E
[
(ξ − ξ′)2
∣∣∣F˜τ] (ω)](4.7)
for all x, x′ ∈ R, ξ, ξ′ ∈ L 2
Fτ
.
We define a map Φs,τ,η,v : H 2([s, τ ];R) → H 2([s, τ ];R) as follows; given αˆ ∈
H 2([s, τ ];R), we define (Xˆt)s≤t≤τ to be the state process corresponding to αˆ with
initial η ∈ L 2
Fs
, i.e. for t ∈ [s, τ ],
(4.8) Xˆt = η +
∫ t
s
αˆtdt+ σ(Wt −Ws) + σ˜(W˜t − W˜s)
We then solve the FBSDE
(4.9)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
Xs = η, Yτ = v(Xτ , Xˆτ )
and set
Φs,τ,η,v(αˆ) := −Y = (−Yt)s≤t≤τ
By (4.6),(4.7), and Theorem 3.2, FBSDE (4.9) is uniquely solvable so the map Φs,τ,η,v
is indeed well-defined. Furthermore, the fixed point of Φ0,T,ξ0,gx clearly gives σ˜-MFG
solution with initial ξ0. We are now ready to begin the proof of Theorem 4.4
Proof. We start by considering the map Φt,T,η,gx , which is well-defined by (A1), (A2),
and Theorem 3.2. The lemma below gives a solution over a small time duration.
Lemma 4.5. There exist γ > 0 depending only on Cg such that for any non-
negative t ∈ [T − γ, T ),Φt,T,η,gx satisfies the following: for any η ∈ L 2
Ft
, there exist
αˆt,T,η ∈ H 2([t, T ];R) such that
Φt,T,η,gx(αˆt,T,η) = αˆt,T,η
This lemma is a special case of Lemma 4.7 which is stated below. The key point of
this lemma is the fact that the small time duration γ is independent of η. It requires
us to prove that Φt,T,η,gx is a contraction map uniformly in η when T − t is sufficiently
small.
Let Γ be the set of t ∈ [0, T ] such that the following statement holds; for any
η ∈ L 2
Ft
, there exist αˆt,T,η ∈ H 2([t, T ];R) satisfying
Φt,T,η,gx(αˆt,T,η) = αˆt,T,η
12 SARAN AHUJA
By Lemma 4.5 above, T − γ ∈ Γ. If 0 ∈ Γ, then we have completed the proof.
Suppose not, let t0 = inf Γ (t0 can still be zero), γ0 > 0 be sufficiently small so that
t0+ γ0 < T −
γ
2 , and let τ ∈ [t0, t0+ γ0)∩Γ. From the fact that τ ∈ Γ, for any initial
η ∈ L 2
Fτ
, there exist a fixed point (αˆτ,ηt )τ≤t≤T ∈ H
2([τ, T ];R) of the map Φτ,T,η,gx .
Let (Xˆτ,ηt )τ≤t≤T denote the corresponding state process, i.e. for t ∈ [τ, T ],
(4.10) Xˆτ,ηt = η +
∫ t
τ
αˆτ,ηt dt+ σ(Wt −Wτ ) + σ˜(W˜t − W˜τ )
Consider the following FBSDE
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t(4.11)
Xτ = x, YT = gx(XT ,L(Xˆ
τ,η
T |F˜T ))
By Theorem 3.2, the FBSDE (4.11) above is uniquely solvable and we denote the
solution by (Xτ,x,ηt , Y
τ,x,η
t , Z
τ,x,η
t , Z˜
τ,x,η
t )τ≤t≤T . Let u : R×L
2
Fτ
×Ω→ R be defined
as u(x, η, ω) = Y τ,x,ητ (ω), then we have the following estimates whose proofs are given
in the next section.
Lemma 4.6. u defined above satisfies, P-a.s.,
(u(x, ξ, ω)− u(x′, ξ, ω))(x− x′) ≥ 0(4.12)
|u(x, ξ, ω)− u(x′, ξ′, ω)|2 ≤ Cu
[
|x− x′|2 + E
[
(ξ − ξ′)2
∣∣∣F˜τ] (ω)](4.13)
for all x, x′ ∈ R, ξ, ξ′ ∈ L 2
Fτ
with the constant Cu depending only on T,Cg, γ.
Next, we attempt to extend the solution further. Let s ∈ [0, τ) to be determined,
η ∈ L 2
Fs
and consider the map Φs,τ,η,u as defined above. We have the following
lemma which enables us to extend the solution beyond t0 creating a contradiction.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose u : R × L 2
Fτ
× Ω → R satisfies (4.12) and (4.13), then
there exist γ′ > 0 depending only on Cu such that for any non-negative s ∈ [τ −γ
′, τ),
the following holds: For any η ∈ L 2
Fs
, there exist αˆs,τ,η ∈ H 2([s, τ ];R) satisfying
Φs,τ,η,u(αˆs,τ,η) = αˆs,τ,η
Note that this lemma implies Lemma 4.5 above by setting u(x, ξ) = gx(x,L(ξ|F˜T )).
Assumption (A1)-(A4) implies that gx satisfies (4.12) and (4.13). The proof of this
lemma is given in the next section. Next, we let γ′ be a constant from Lemma 4.7
and s be a non-negative element in [τ −γ′, τ). We construct a following control αˆs,T,η
by letting
αˆs,T,η =
{
αˆs,τ,η, if s ≤ t < τ
αˆτ,T,Xˆτ , if τ ≤ t ≤ T
By definition of u, it follows that αˆs,T,η satisfies
Φs,T,η,gx(αˆs,T,η) = αˆs,T,η
We are left to check that αˆs,T,η is in H 2([s, T ];R). To do so, we need the following
estimate
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Lemma 4.8. Suppose (Xˆt, Yˆt, Zˆt,
ˆ˜Zt)τ≤t≤T ∈ (H
2([τ, T ];R))4 satisfies the FB-
SDE
dXˆt = −Yˆtdt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYˆt = ZˆtdWt +
ˆ˜ZtdW˜t
Xˆτ = ξ, YˆT = gx(XˆT ,L(XˆT |F˜T ))
where ξ ∈ L 2
Fτ
, then the following estimate holds:
(4.14) E
[
sup
τ≤t≤T
[|Xt|
2 + |Yt|
2]
]
≤ CT,Cg (E[ξ
2] + g2x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2)
Let Xˆ = (Xˆt)s≤t≤T denote the state process corresponding to the control αˆ
s,T,η.
Then by using estimate (4.14), we get
E
[∫ T
s
(αˆs,T,η)2dt
]
= E
[∫ τ
s
(αˆs,τ,η)2dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
τ
(αˆτ,T,Xˆτ )2dt
]
≤ E
[∫ τ
s
(αˆs,τ,η)2dt
]
+ CT,Cg
[
E[Xˆ2τ ] + g
2
x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2
]
≤ C˜T,Cg
(
E
[∫ τ
s
(αˆs,τ,η)2dt
]
+ E[η2] + g2x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2
)
<∞
which implies αˆs,T,η ∈ H 2([s, T ];R). The proof of Lemma 4.8 is presented in the
next section.
We have shown that s ∈ Γ. From Lemma 4.7, we know that γ′ depends only on
Cu which is independent of τ . Therefore, we can select γ0 sufficiently small so that
γ0 < γ
′, so that τ−γ′ ≤ t0+γ0−γ
′ < t0. Thus, we can select s to be strictly less than
t0 or s = 0 creating a contradiction as we assumed 0 /∈ Γ and t0 = inf Γ. Therefore,
0 ∈ Γ and we have completed the proof.
5. Main Lemma. In this section, we prove all the lemmas that was used in
Theorem 4.4. The first one is a priori estimate of the so-called “decoupling field”
while the second lemma is a construction of σ˜-MFG solution using Banach fixed point
theorem over a small time duration. The third lemma give an FBSDE estimate needed
to ensure that the extended control remains admissible.
5.1. Proof of Lemma 4.6. Let x1, x2 ∈ R and (X
i
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)τ≤t≤T denote
the solution to the FBSDE (4.11) with initial condition X iτ = xi, i = 1, 2. Let ∆Yt =
Y 1t − Y
2
t and ∆Xt = X
1
t −X
2
t , then by applying Ito¯’s lemma to ∆Yt∆Xt from τ to
T and taking expectation conditional on Fτ (denote by Eτ [·]), we get
Eτ [∆YT∆XT ]−∆Yτ∆Xτ = −Eτ
[∫ T
τ
∆Y 2t dt
]
By convexity assumption (A2), it follows that
∆YT∆XT =
(
gx(X
1
T ,L(Xˆ
τ,η
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
τ,η
T |F˜T ))
)
∆Xt ≥ 0
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Thus,
∆Yτ∆Xτ = Eτ [∆YT∆XT ] + Eτ
[∫ T
τ
∆Y 2t dt
]
≥ 0
That is,
(u(x1, η)− u(x2, η))(x1 − x2) ≥ 0
Now we proceed to show (4.13). Let η1, η2 ∈ L
2
Fτ
and we consider u(x1, η1) and
u(x2, η2). For i = 1, 2, let (X
i
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)τ≤t≤T denote the solution to the corre-
sponding FBSDE (4.11) from the definition of u(xi, ηi). In other words, they satisfy
dX it = −Y
i
t dt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dY it = Z
i
tdWt + Z˜
i
tdW˜t(5.1)
X iτ = xi, Y
i
T = gx(X
i
T ,L(Xˆ
τ,ηi
T |F˜T ))
where (Xˆτ,η
i
t )τ≤t≤T is given by
Xˆτ,ηt = η +
∫ t
τ
αˆτ,ηt dt+ σ(Wt −Wτ ) + σ˜(W˜t − W˜τ ),
and (αˆτ,ηit )τ≤t≤T is the σ˜-MFG solution over [τ, T ] with initial ηi, i.e. the unique fixed
point of the map Φτ,T,η
i,gx . For notational convenience, we write Xˆτ,η
i
t as Xˆ
i
t . We
begin by getting a bound on Xˆ1t −Xˆ
2
t before we go back to bound u(x1, η1)−u(x2, η2).
From the definition of Φτ,T,η
i,gx and the fact that (αˆτ,ηit )τ≤t≤T is the unique fixed
point of this map, it follows that (Xˆ it)τ≤t≤T is the forward process of the unique
solution of FBSDE
dXˆ it = −Yˆ
i
t dt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
dYˆ it = Zˆ
i
tdWt +
ˆ˜ZitdW˜t
Xˆ iτ = η
i, Yˆ iT = gx(Xˆ
i
T ,L(Xˆ
i
T |F˜T ))
Let ∆Xˆt = Xˆ
1
t −Xˆ
2
t and define ∆Yˆt,∆Zˆt,∆
ˆ˜Zt,∆Xt,∆Yt,∆Zt,∆Z˜t,∆x,∆η similarly.
Then note that (∆Xˆt,∆Yˆt,∆Zˆt,∆
ˆ˜Zt)τ≤t≤T satisfies
d∆Xˆt = −∆Yˆtdt
d∆Yˆt = ∆ZˆtdWt +∆
ˆ˜ZtdW˜t(5.2)
∆Xˆτ = ∆η, ∆YˆT = gx(Xˆ
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(Xˆ
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T )),
so we get by Ito¯’s lemma that
d(∆Yˆt∆Xˆt) = −(∆Yˆt)
2dt+∆Xˆtd∆Yˆt
Taking integral from τ to T and taking expectation conditional on F˜τ (where E˜τ [·] :=
E[·|F˜τ ]), we have∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt ≤ E˜τ [∆Xˆτ∆Yˆτ ]− E˜τ (∆YˆT∆XˆT )
= E˜τ [∆Xˆτ∆Yˆτ ]− E˜τ ((gx(Xˆ
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(Xˆ
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T )))∆XˆT )
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Using (A4), we get
E˜τ
[
(gx(Xˆ
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(Xˆ
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T )))∆XˆT
]
≥ 0
so that, by Young’s inequality,
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt ≤ E˜[∆Xˆτ∆Yˆτ ]
≤
1
4ε
E˜[∆η2] + εE˜[∆Yˆ 2τ ](5.3)
for any ε > 0. Since ∆Yˆt is a martingale, it follows that E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
τ ] ≤ E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ] for
all t ∈ [τ, T ]. Thus, together with the fact that τ ≤ T − γ2 , we have
(5.4) E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
τ ] ≤
1
T − τ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt ≤
2
γ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt
Similarly, we have
(5.5) E˜τ [∆Y
2
τ ] ≤
1
T − τ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
t ]dt ≤
2
γ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
t ]dt
The inequality (5.5) will be used later in the proof. Next, going back to (5.3) and use
(5.4), it follows that
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt ≤
1
4ε
E˜τ [∆η
2] +
2ε
γ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt
Therefore, for sufficiently small ε, we have
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Yˆ
2
t ]dt ≤ Cε,γE˜τ [∆η
2]
Thus, by (5.2),
(5.6) E˜τ (∆XˆT )
2 = E˜τ
(
∆η −
∫ T
τ
Yˆtdt
)2
≤ C′ε,γE˜τ [∆η]
2
Now we go back to showing (4.13). Note that (∆Xt,∆Yt,∆Zt,∆Z˜t)τ≤t≤T satisfies
d∆Xt = −∆Ytdt
d∆Yt = ∆ZtdWt +∆Z˜tdW˜t
∆Xτ = ∆x, ∆YT = gx(X
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T ))
so we have
(5.7) E˜τ (∆XT )
2 = E˜τ
(
∆x −
∫ T
τ
Ytdt
)2
≤ 2(∆x)2 + 2T
∫ T
τ
E(∆Ys)
2ds,
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then following the same sequence of inequalities as we did earlier,
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
t ]dt = E˜τ (∆Xτ∆Y )− E˜τ
[
(gx(X
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T )))∆XT
]
= E˜τ (∆Xτ∆Yτ )− E˜τ
[
(gx(X
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))∆XT
]
+ E˜τ
[
gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T )))∆XT )
]
By convexity assumption (A2),
E˜τ
[
(gx(X
1
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T )))∆XT
]
≥ 0
and by Lipschitz continuity (in m) assumption (A3),
E˜τ
[
gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
2
T |F˜T ))− gx(X
2
T ,L(Xˆ
1
T |F˜T )))∆XT )
]
≤ CgE˜τ
(
(E˜T [∆Xˆ
2
T ])
1
2∆XT
)
where E˜T [·] := E[·|F˜T ]. Thus,∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
t ]dt ≤ E˜τ (∆Xτ∆Yτ ) + CgE˜τ ((E˜T [∆Xˆ
2
T ])
1
2∆XT )
≤ Cε,Cg (∆x
2 + E˜τ [∆Xˆ
2
T ]) + ε
(
E˜τ [∆Y
2
τ ] + E˜τ [∆X
2
T ]
)
From (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7), it follows that
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
t ]dt ≤ C
′
ε,Cg
(∆x2 + E[∆Xˆ2T ]) + ε
(
E˜τ [∆Y
2
τ ] + 2T
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
s ]ds
)
≤ C′ε,γ(∆x
2 + E˜τ [∆η
2]) + ε
(
2
γ
+ 2T
)∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
s ]ds
Thus, by selecting ε sufficiently small, we get
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Y
2
s ]ds ≤ Cγ,T,Cg(∆x
2 + E˜τ [∆η
2])
Therefore, using (5.5) again,
E˜τ [∆Y
2
τ ] ≤
2
γ
∫ T
τ
E˜τ [∆Ys]
2ds ≤ C˜γ,T,Cg(∆x
2 + E˜τ [∆η]
2)
Observe that all the coefficients in the FBSDE (5.1) are F˜t-progressively measurable,
therefore, Yτ is F˜τ -measurable. Hence,
∆Y 2τ = E˜τ [∆Y
2
τ ] ≤ C˜γ,T,Cg(∆x
2 + E˜τ [∆η]
2)
or equivalently,
(u(x1, η1)− u(x1, η2))
2 ≤ C˜γ,T,Cg((x1 − x2)
2 + E[(η1 − η2)
2|F˜τ ])
as desired.
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5.2. Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let αˆ1, αˆ2 ∈ H 2([s, τ ];R), (X it , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)s≤t≤τ
denote the solution of corresponding FBSDE (4.9) from the definition of Φs,τ,η,u(αˆi),
(Xˆ it)s≤t≤τ denote the state process corresponding to (αˆ
i
t)s≤t≤τ with initial η ∈ L
2
Fs
as
defined by (4.8). Let ∆Xt = X
1
t −X
2
t and define ∆Yt,∆Zt,∆Z˜t,∆αˆt,∆Xˆt similarly.
Note that (∆Xt,∆Yt,∆Zt,∆Z˜t)s≤t≤τ satisfies
d∆Xt = −∆Ytdt
d∆Yt = ∆ZtdWt +∆Z˜tdW˜t
∆Xs = 0, ∆Yτ = u(X
1
τ , Xˆ
1
τ )− u(X
2
τ , Xˆ
2
τ )
Since ∆Yt is a martingale, it follows that E[∆Y
2
t ] ≤ E[∆Y
2
τ ] for all t ∈ [s, τ ] and thus,
(5.8) E[∆X2τ ] = E
[(∫ τ
s
∆Ytdt
)2]
≤ (τ − s)
∫ τ
s
E[∆Y 2t ]dt ≤ (τ − s)
2
E[∆Y 2τ ]
Furthermore,
(5.9) E[∆Xˆτ ]
2 = E
[(∫ τ
s
∆αˆtdt
)2]
≤ (τ − s)E
(∫ τ
s
∆αˆ2t
)
dt
Therefore, by (4.13), (5.8), and (5.9), we have
E[∆Y 2τ ] = E[u(X
1
τ , Xˆ
1
τ )− u(X
2
τ , Xˆ
2
τ )]
≤ Cu
(
E[∆X2τ ] + E[E[∆Xˆ
2
τ |F˜τ ]]
)
≤ Cu
[
(τ − s)2E[∆Y 2τ ] + (τ − s)E
(∫ τ
s
(∆αˆt)
2dt
)]
Hence, for τ − s sufficiently small such that Cu(τ − s)
2 < 1, we get
E[∆Y 2τ ] ≤
Cu(τ − s)
1− Cu(τ − s)2
E
(∫ τ
s
(∆αˆt)
2dt
)
=
Cu(τ − s)
1− Cu(τ − s)2
‖∆αˆ‖2
H 2([s,τ ];R)
and it follows that
‖Φ(αˆ1)−Φ(αˆ2)‖2
H 2([s,τ ];R) =
∫ τ
s
E[∆Y 2t ]dt ≤ (τ−s)E[∆Y
2
τ ] ≤
Cu(τ − s)
2
1− Cu(τ − s)2
‖αˆ1−αˆ2‖2
H 2([s,τ ];R)
As a result, we get a contraction map for sufficiently small τ − s depending only on
Cu as desired.
5.3. Proof of Lemma 4.8. Applying Ito¯’s lemma to XˆtYˆt from τ to T yields
E[XˆT gx(XˆT ,L(XˆT |F˜T ))]− E[ξYˆτ ] = −
∫ T
τ
E[Yˆ 2t ]dt+
∫ T
τ
E[σZˆt + σ˜
ˆ˜Zt]dt
From the weak monotonicity assumption (A4), we get
E[XˆT gx(XˆT ,L(XˆT |F˜T ))] ≥ E[XˆT gx(0, δ0)]
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Thus,
∫ T
τ
E[Yˆ 2t ]dt ≤ E[ξYˆτ ]− E[XˆT gx(0, δ0)] +
∫ T
τ
E[σZˆt + σ˜
ˆ˜Zt]dt
≤ Cε,T
[
E[ξ2] + g2x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2
]
+ εE
[
Xˆ2T + Yˆ
2
τ +
∫ T
τ
[Zˆ2r +
ˆ˜Z2r ]dr
]
Applying Ito¯’s lemma to Yˆ 2t from t to T together with the Lipschitz assumption (A1)
and (A3) give, for all t ∈ [τ, T ],
(5.10)
E[Yˆ 2t ] +
∫ T
t
E[Zˆ2r +
ˆ˜Z2r ]dr ≤ E[Yˆ
2
T ] = E[g
2
x(XˆT ,L(XˆT |F˜T ))] ≤ Cg(g
2
x(0, δ0) + E[Xˆ
2
T ])
Thus, we get a bound of the form
∫ T
τ
E[Yˆ 2t ]dt ≤ Cε,T,Cg (E[ξ
2] + g2x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2) + εE[Xˆ2T ]
Note that by Doob’s Martingale inequality, we also have
E[ sup
τ≤t≤T
|Xˆt|
2] ≤ CT
(∫ T
τ
E[Yˆ 2t ]dt+ σ
2 + σ˜2
)
Combining with the previous bound, we can select ε sufficiently small depending only
on T,Cg to get
(5.11) E[ sup
τ≤t≤T
|Xˆt|
2] ≤ CT,Cg (E[ξ
2] + g2x(0, δ0) + σ
2 + σ˜2)
Applying Doob’s Martingale inequality to Yt and use (5.10) and (5.11), we then com-
plete the proof.
6. Summary and Conclusions. The aim of this paper is to establish an ex-
istence and uniqueness result for a Mean Field Game in the presence of common
noise. We assume a linear-convex control problem with the quadratic running cost
depending only on the control and a general convex and Lipschitz terminal cost func-
tion. In addition, we assume that the terminal cost also satisfies what we call a weak
monotonicity condition (see (4.3)).
For the existence result, our assumptions are similar to those used in [7] for a
0-MFG problem except that we replace the weak mean-reverting assumption (4.1)
with the weak monotonicity condition (4.3). Our existence proof is also different from
those of a 0-MFG problem which rely on the Schauder fixed point theorem. Instead,
we apply the Banach fixed point theorem to given existence of a solution over a small
time duration and show that it can be extended to an arbitrary time duration. For
the uniqueness part, under the convexity assumption on the cost functions, our result
extends those of a 0-MFG problem as our weak monotonicity condition is weaker than
the monotonicity condition used in [5, 7].
Although we assume a simple state process and running cost, our result is expected
to hold for a more general setting, namely a model with a linear state process
dXt = (Aαt +BXt + Cm¯t)dt+ σdWt + σ˜dW˜t
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and a running cost of the form
f(t, x, α,m) = f0(t, x, α) + f1(t, x,m)
where f0 is Lipschitz and convex in (x, α) and strongly convex in α, f1 is Lipschitz in
(x,m) and satisfies the weak monotonicity condition.
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